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Introduction

Fertility and family formation of British Pakistanis
British Pakistani fertility rates present a demographic anomaly. Over the past few decades the UK, along with the rest of Europe, has experienced unprecedented fertility decline to below-replacement levels (Kohler et al, 2002) . Despite a recent small upturn, low and late fertility looks set to be sustained (Goldstein et al, 2009 ). However, two minority ethnic populations within the UK, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, continue to have much higher fertility rates, close to three children per woman (Coleman and Dubuc, 2010) : Table 1 . British Pakistanis have particularly low levels of childlessness and higher progression to third and higher-order births than the general British population (Penn and Lambert, 2002; Sobotka, 2008) , reflected in higher mean ideal family sizes (Penn and Lambert, 2002) .
Table 1 about here
This is not to say that British Pakistani fertility has remained static. Like other groups in the UK, birth rates of British Pakistanis have declined substantially since the 1970s. Moreover, fertility rates are substantially lower for the second generation (TFR=2.5) than first-generation migrants (TFR=3.5), a further indicator of demographic change (Coleman and Dubuc, 2010) . There has also been a shift towards later child-bearing among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, but this has been far less pronounced than for other ethnic groups in the UK (Coleman and Dubuc, 2010: 28; see also Sobotka, 2008) . Marriage among British Pakistanis remains almost universal: 80% of British Pakistani men and 90% of women aged 25-29y were currently married, compared with 49% and 60% for white British men and women respectively, although there is evidence of slightly later marriage among the second generation compared with first-generation migrants (Berrington, 1994 , using data from LFS 1989 , 1990 , 1991 .
Most explanations for the 'persistence' of relatively high and early fertility among British Pakistanis focus on 'culture' and 'religion'. A substantial literature points to Pakistani women's lack of autonomy around marriage and child-bearing. Based on work in Pakistan, Mumtaz and Salway (2007; found that older women (particularly mothers-in-law) typically take charge of reproductive decisions; submission to the authority of elders was seen to be an integral component of femininity (see also Hamid et al, 2010) . Others have described pressures exerted on young women to become pregnant straight after marriage and to bear many children, resulting in very low rates of contraception use (e.g. Agha, 2010; Saleem and Pasha, 2008; Casterline et al, 2001; Kadir et al, 2003; Pachuari et al, 2002) . Less research has explored these issues among Pakistani diaspora, but Hennink et al (1999) found that many young UK-based South Asian women felt under pressure to become pregnant soon after marriage, to establish their position in the marital household (see also Woollett et al, 1991a ).
Son preference is one feature of Pakistani kinship practices that is often blamed for the maintenance of high fertility in South Asia, although recent studies also indicate a desire for a balance of sons and daughters (Fuse, 2010; Jayaraman et al, 2009; Muhammed, 2009; Hussain et al, 2000) . Strong gender preferences are thought to sustain high fertility, as parents 'keep trying' for a child of the required gender. Culturally-driven gender preferences have been found to feature prominently among Pakistanis living in the UK (Woollett et al, 1991a; Hennink et al, 1999; Dhillon and MacArthur, 2010) , although gender preferences for children are also common among majority ethnic populations in Europe (Hank, 2007 ).
An alternative set of explanations for sustained high fertility among British Pakistanis focuses on socioeconomic position which, as Sobotka (2008:234) argues, can strongly modify the effects of 'culture'. 60%
of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK are in the lowest quintile of income distribution (Hussain and Bagguley, 2007) . In the UK as a whole, higher fertility and earlier child-bearing is associated with low socio-economic and educational status (Rendall et al, 2010; Ekert-Jaffé et al, 2002) . Coleman and Dubuc (2010:35) argue that, 'If some minorities remain concentrated in lower occupational groups, with poor educational attainment and high levels of unemployment and economic inactivity, birth rates are unlikely to converge to national norms.'
Reproductive decisions and practices in the context of social change
If the high fertility of British Pakistanis is underpinned by 'culture' and/or low socio-economic position, it is important to understand how these are changing. The 'socialisation' (or 'assimilation') hypothesis predicts that migrants' descendents, exposed to the reproductive behaviour, values and norms of the receiving country, as well as those of their parents, will gradually develop fertility patterns that converge with those of the receiving country (Milewski, 2010; Kulu, 2005) . Crucially, however, it is important to recognise that 'ethnicity', 'place of birth' or 'religion' cannot be used straightforwardly (as in many standard demographic analyses) as unproblematic and neatly-bounded proxies for complex sets of 4 beliefs and practices. Indeed, the approach we take here is to see culture, not as a simple variable, but as a dynamic aspect of ethnic identity for Pakistanis living in the UK today and moreover one that is continually (re)constructed and (re)negotiated in relation to shifting and permeable boundaries (Carrithers, 1992; Buckler, 2007; Barth, 2000; Cohen, 1985) . A large and growing literature documents these complex and shifting identities of young Pakistanis in Britain. Defying simple linear 'acculturation' theories, young British South Asians are developing their own ways of being, foregrounding different repertoires of attachment and identification (Pakistani, Mirpuri, Muslim, British and others) through, for example, dress, food and entertainment (e.g. Werbner, 2002; Malson et al, 2002; Woollett et al, 2004; Ballard, 1994; Shaw, 1994; .
Alongside this complex layering has been increasing engagement in education and, to a lesser extent, employment. Young South Asian women have generally been seen as one of the most excluded and disadvantaged groups, with low levels of educational qualifications and labour market participation (Hussain and Bagguley, 2007:1; Dale, 2002) . However, the last couple of decades have seen significant increases in the numbers of British Pakistani women (and men) entering higher education: controlling for socio-economic status, young Pakistanis in Britain are now more likely to go to university than their white counterparts (Hussain and Bagguley, 2007 ; see also Modood, 2005; Thapar-Bjorkert and Sanghera, 2010) Employment has been slower to shift. Salway (2007) recently reported that economic activity among UK Pakistani and Bangladeshi women has remained persistently low over the last two decades. The exception to this is unmarried graduates in their 20s, who have very high levels of economic activity.
Even after marriage, Dale et al (2002:942) remark that '[Pakistani] women with degree-level qualifications showed considerable determination to combine paid employment with family life' (see also Butt et al, 2010; Kamenou, 2008 ). However, although child-bearing marks a sharp drop in women's economic activity across all ethnic groups, the drop is most pronounced for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women (Dale et al, 2006) . And for the majority of working-age Pakistani women in the UK, with dependent children and few educational qualifications, employment rates remain low (Salway, 2007; Dale et al, 2006) .
There has been very little qualitative research on the ways in which British South Asian women navigate these new socio-economic opportunities in relation to family life and child-bearing. Two decades ago, 5 Woollett et al (1991a, b) conducted interviews with 100 South Asian women (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh) with a child under two years, and 46 comparable non-Asian British women, recruited from clinical settings in London. Their work revealed the complex nature of reproductive decision-making, which involved reconciling different ideas about appropriate family size, use of contraception and timing/spacing of children (Woollett et al 1991a:238) . South Asian women valued large families and generally wanted to have at least one child of each sex. Sons were seen as crucial for continuing the family name, while girls were valued as companions for mothers. In deciding when to begin childbearing, South Asian women talked about balancing different needs and priorities: financial and other responsibilities of early parenthood were weighed against family pressures to have children early, the need to secure their position in the marital family, and concerns about side-effects of contraception (Woollett et al, 1991a:247) . After the first child, workload considerations in caring for children of different ages and perceived psychological impacts on the children influenced decisions around the timing of subsequent births. Overall, contraceptive use was lowest among South Asian Muslims, particularly recent migrants to the UK (Woollett et al, 1991b ).
More recently, Hennink et al (1999) distinguished two patterns of contraceptive use among 29 British women from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian backgrounds. 'Non-professional' women, who were not in employment or further education, typically used no contraception between marriage and first pregnancy, and 57% had given birth within a year of marriage. Most 'non-professional' women had arrived in the UK as brides, lived in extended families with in-laws, and had limited personal autonomy.
Early child-bearing was driven by the desire to become pregnant, pressure from husbands or other family members, religious reasons, and lack of contraceptive knowledge. Use of contraception in this group rose markedly after the first birth, following contact with health professionals. By contrast, the eight 'professional' women, who were in occupations requiring at least two years post-school training or further education, had all lived in the UK for at least 20 years (most were UK-born). Most resided in nuclear families, and claimed that their in-laws had little influence over family matters. Six of the eight used birth control directly after marriage; the typical gap between marriage and first birth was 2-5 years.
These studies offer important insights into the dynamics of British South Asian women's reproductive decision-making. However, as we have indicated, there have been substantial socio-demographic changes in the two decades since these studies were conducted. Moreover, both were based on ethnically heterogeneous samples. Although they acknowledge heterogeneity within the category 6 'South Asian', the necessarily limited number of interviews for each ethnic group precludes a more detailed understanding of the specific dynamics operating among British Pakistanis. (As indicated above, the demographic regime of British Pakistanis is very different to that of UK-Indians.) It is this gap we aim to address, by presenting findings from intensive qualitative research on the processes of family formation among British Pakistani Muslims living in Northeast England.
Study Population and Methods
The material presented in this paper comes from interviews with 91 men and women identifying as (Iqbal, 2006) . Pakistanis living elsewhere in Britain also come overwhelmingly from these two regions, with Mirpuris dominating in Birmingham, Leeds, Bradford and Bristol, and Panjabis in Manchester and Glasgow (Shaw, 1988; Werbner, 1990 ).
The interviews discussed here constituted the first phase of fieldwork for an ESRC-funded study on infertility [http://www.dur.ac.uk/asian.infertilities/]. The aim of this phase was to understand the full range of reproductive lives and experiences of this population, before focussing in phase two on those with direct experience of infertility (which we discuss elsewhere: Hampshire et al, forthcoming, Simpson et al, forthcoming). The 91 interviewees were recruited from community centres, community-based classes, Sure Start centres and other public venues frequented by Pakistanis, and by snowball sampling from this group. Snowball sampling allowed us to contact individuals with a range of reproductive experiences in this 'hard-to-reach' population (Bernard, 1995; Hennink et al, 2011) . It also meant that interviewees were not merely a set of individual 'data-points'; many were active participants in each others' biographies -a situation which enabled us to piece together a variety of different perspectives on the ways in which family building is constructed, negotiated and contested, within families and wider social networks.
Efforts were made to ensure a range of age groups and social class across both genders, but we did not deliberately target those with reproductive difficulties. Most of the interviews were conducted by two research associates, both of whom were women in their late twenties. Their gender undoubtedly affected access to potential research participants in terms both of quantity and quality. Of the 91 interviewees, 65 were female, and the interviews with women tended to be longer, fuller, more detailed and franker than those with men. Consequently, one limitation of this paper is that women's experiences and perspectives are better represented than those of men.
Interviews were informal and wide-ranging, and were conducted in English, Punjabi or Urdu, according to participants' preferences (one of the research associates was a British Pakistani and spoke all three languages fluently). We used a life history format, encouraging participants to talk through their marital and reproductive lives in chronological sequence, although there were often deviations from this. As well as gathering basic information on the timing of marriages, pregnancies, etc., the interviews focussed principally on understanding people's feelings, beliefs, desires and motivations around marital and reproductive practices, and on the influence of others (explicitly or implicitly) on their decisions. In a few cases, participants were re-interviewed after a period of some months, to follow up on new developments in their lives and reproductive careers. We explained to research participants that these interviews formed part of a larger study on infertility, but we made it clear that in at this stage we were interested in finding out more generally on people's experiences of having children and building families, rather than on infertility per se.
All but a couple of interviewees agreed for interviews to be recorded; these were then fully transcribed.
Interviews conducted in Punjabi or Urdu were translated into English, but key terms (for example, kinship terms or words expressing particular feelings that could not easily be translated) were left in the original language. Transcribed interviews were coded for themes using NVivo. Subsequent analysis was based on the principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1994) .
Ethical consent was obtained from Durham University School for Health before commencement of fieldwork.
This material is thus unconventional by demographers' standards. Instead of a large, representative sample, we present a set of very detailed narratives from one particular group, in order to understand the meanings, processes and motivations behind apparently anomalous demographic trends. We situate our work within the growing field of European anthropological demography (Bernardi and Hutter, 2008; Coast et al, 2007) , that seeks to bring ethnographic insights from qualitative research to understand demographic patterns and trends.
Socio-demographic characteristics of the research participants
Socio-demographic characteristics of the research participants are shown in Table 2 . Just over half those interviewed were born and raised in Pakistan and moved to the UK after being married; the remainder were either born in the UK or born in Pakistan and moved to the UK during childhood. Interviewees had a wide range of educational backgrounds, from no schooling at all (for women) to university degrees.
Table 2 about here
In terms of inter-generational differences, our small, non-random sample appears to be following national trends (Modood et al, 2005; Hussain and Bagguley, 2007; Dale et al, 2006; Salway, 2007) .
Younger women had higher levels of education, and more of them were employed, than their older counterparts, although only a minority of women in each age group was economically active: Table 3 .
Several interviewees contrasted the limited opportunities available to immigrants in the 1970s/80s to those today. There is a strong perception of change and, if not actual upward socio-economic mobility, at least the possibility of it through education and work.
Table 3 about here
All of the 28 women in our sample aged 40+ (henceforth 'older women') considered their child-bearing to be over. These women had typically begun child-bearing early. Only three of these women had fewer than two children and, in all three cases, this had not been by design. The most common number of children was four (nine women), and eight had given birth to more than four children. Younger women (those aged 17-39) also seemed set to continue this pattern: most interviewees in their early thirties had three or four children.
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Marriage is still early and effectively universal for Pakistani women in our study sites: all our interviewees who were beyond their teens had been married. There appears to be a small intergenerational shift in age at first marriage: two-thirds of the older women interviewed said they were married by age 17, while the majority of younger women married between 18-20y. Relatively few women in either age group were still single by age 21 (6/34 younger women 1 ; 3/26 older women 2 ) and none of the women aged 21+ that we interviewed was still single.
Once married, a pattern of early pregnancy predominates. Three-fifths (34/56 3 ) of women became pregnant within a year of marriage; this figure rises to three-quarters (31/42) when accounting for postmarriage spousal separation (common in transnational marriages where a UK visa is required) and excluding women experiencing other involuntary constraints (infertility, serious health problems, spousal death, etc.), with no apparent difference between older and younger women. Only seven of the 56 women had used contraception before their first pregnancy (6/32 'younger women' and 1/24 'older women'). Use of contraception rose, among our interviewees, after the first pregnancy, and again after the second one, especially for younger women. Nonetheless, excluding women for whom involuntary factors precluded an early second childbirth, nearly three-quarters of younger women and the vast majority of older women had given birth to a second child within two years of the first, and a fifth of each age group had a second child within one year of the first.
Following Hennink et al (1999) , who found the contraceptive practices of 'non-professional' South Asian women (not in employment or further education, most of whom had arrived in the UK as brides) differed markedly from those of 'professional' women (in professions requiring at least two years postschool education, all resident for at least 20 years in the UK), we classified our 'younger women' interviewees (under 40) by country of childhood residence, education and employment status: Table 4 .
Notably, none of the women who grew up in Pakistan were economically active at the time of interview, and most had stopped schooling by 16. By contrast, most of those born or raised in the UK had pursued some form of post-16 education, and nearly half were either in employment or education at the time of interview.
Table 4 about here
Our interviewees did not demonstrate such distinct patterns of demographic behaviour as those identified Hennink et al., in that a pattern of early marriage, early first pregnancy and non-use of contraception before first pregnancy prevailed across all groups, regardless of educational or employment status: Table 5 . Nonetheless, it appears that the few 'demographic pioneers' (later marriage and childbirth) were those with post-secondary education and/or those who were studying or employed at the time of interview. Notably, five out the six women who had married for the first time aged 21+ were in this category, as were four of the six who reported having used contraception before their first pregnancy; issues that we return to later.
Table 5 about here
To summarise, our interviewees' socio-demographic profiles seem broadly to be following national trends. Fertility is high and early, by UK standards. Marriage remains universal and almost all women are married by age 20. Very few use contraception before their first pregnancy, and the norm is to become pregnant within the first year of marriage, although more reported using contraception before embarking on subsequent pregnancies. These patterns prevail across educational and employment status among the women we interviewed although, as noted above, the 'demographic pioneers' come disproportionately from more educated and/or economically active women.
We should re-iterate that it is not possible to extrapolate from this small, non-random sample to the demographic behavior of British Pakistanis more generally, nor is this our intention. Rather, we have presented data on the marital and reproductive behavior of our (female) interviewees, in order to contextualize the ensuing qualitative information on reproductive decision-making and negotiation, and to highlight both the links and discrepancies between reproductive desires, imperatives and outcomes.
For the remainder of the paper we discuss the decision-making processes and meanings underpinning these child-bearing patterns.
Reproductive pressures, aspirations and desires
Literature on the maintenance of high fertility among South Asians (in Britain and elsewhere) often emphasises the reproductive demands exerted on young women by family members (particularly mothers-in-law). Several women we interviewed, both older and younger, reported experiencing pressures to bear children quickly after marriage, and to produce a son:
'When I got married, [mother-in-law] Although there were inter-generational differences in desired family size, the norm was four children, regardless of respondents' age or gender: Table 6 . Education, employment and country of childhood residence did not appear to affect family size ideals: indeed all three 'younger women' who wanted more than four children had been born in the UK and were college-educated.
[ Table 6 about here]
Our interviewees generally aspired to begin child-bearing shortly after marriage; women in particular often had a strong emotional attachment to the idea of early motherhood. As one young (UK-born) Many women attached such importance to having children that they didn't want to risk delaying motherhood in case something should go wrong. As Naseem (above), who had given up work to have children, put it, 'To be honest, I wanted a family, so I didn't want anything coming in the way.' Like Woollett et al's (1991a) interviewees, our research participants placed a high value on having both sons and daughters. While sons were important for continuing the family name and joining family businesses, daughters fulfilled important emotional needs for both mothers and fathers (see also Shaw, 2004 Achieving a balance of boys and girls is important, not just within the nuclear family, but across the extended family or biradari. British Pakistanis usually marry within the extended family: more than 80% of our interviewees had married a close relative, usually a cousin (see also Shaw, 2009 However, again, it was not just external pressures that were at play here. In traditional Pakistani kinship systems, there is a blurring of boundaries between siblings and cousins, and between sons/daughters and nephews/nieces. Although there are important structural differences (for example, cousins are preferred marriage partners, while siblings are clearly prohibited from marrying) the same kin terms are often used for both groups (bhaji for older sister or female cousin, and bhen for younger sister or female cousin; bhaijan and bhai for older and younger brother/male cousin respectively). This point is further exemplified by this mother's comment: 'I always class mine [children] as six, not four; I always take her [sister's] kids as mine.' Although this appears to be changing (see below), interviewees often thought about their family-building strategies, not just in relation to their own children, but to the wider group of cousins. Thus, Naseem describes the particular importance she placed on having a son: 'The first child was a boy ... and so it was a big thing that I had a boy after such a long time in our family since we had a boy', while Rashid, a man in his late twenties with two sons, says that he longs for a daughter, 'because we have no girls in our [extended] family.' Having nieces and nephews can also make it easier, sometimes, for those who are not able to achieve their reproductive aspirations. Rukhsana who, at the age of 38 had only one child because she left an unhappy marriage, regretted not having been able to provide her son with siblings, but took comfort from her son's relationship with his cousins: 'My
nephews are very close to him. They have lived together and consider themselves like brothers.'
In summary, high and early fertility appears to be supported both by the wider family concerns, to continue the family name and provide marriage partners for the next generation, and by individuals' own desires, often rooted in personal experiences of growing up in large, supportive families. However, as we shall see, there can be tensions between individuals' and wider families' reproductive imperatives and aspirations, both of which have to be managed within the socio-economic realities of 21 st century Britain.
Ideal plans and real lives: balancing desires, pressures and aspirations
Many young parents worried about the practicalities of raising children 'well' in the UK. Shazia, a 26-year-old mother had decided to stop at three children, in order to have enough time for each to ensure that they would grow up to be 'respectful', 'decent' and behave 'properly', a view echoed by many others. Providing materially for children was a concern for many, and several young men in particular emphasised the importance of financial stability before starting a family. Concerns about raising children 'well' also fed into decisions about birth spacing: parents talked about wanting enough of a gap to 'enjoy' each child and make sure they 'develop well'; this was sometimes weighed against a view that closer birth spacing encouraged stronger sibling bonds.
Managing transnational families and marriages also played into reproductive calculus. Almost all our interviewees had transnational arranged marriages, with the Pakistan-based partner moving to the UK.
Adapting to a new country and family situation can be difficult (see also Charsley, 2005) , and several interviewees thought it important to delay starting a family until the migrating spouse feels 'settled' in the UK. Jameela, now in her mid-thirties, wanted to avoid pregnancy when her husband first came to the UK 'because even though he was physically here, he wasn't mentally here.' Again, there is a complex interplay here between individuals, couples and wider families. Some women arriving in the UK as young brides saw early child-bearing as a way to establish themselves and secure their position within the marital household (see Woollett, 1991a; Hennink, 1999 Rashida was forced to marry her cousin from Pakistan at the age of 18. She suffered intense pressure to bear a son and several years of physical and psychological abuse from her husband and in-laws. She was too afraid seek help from anyone, but she finally called her brother, who brought her back to her own family. Two years later, after a long battle, she gained custody of her son. Finally, Rashida was able to make her own choices. When her son started nursery, she enrolled in a local community college and moved into a council house with her son. She then took a part-time job, where she met, and eventually married, a non-Pakistani man. She went on to have more children; as she put it, 'It felt right to bring a child into this world with someone who loved me and I loved.' However, the price she paid was permanent estrangement from her family, who refused to accept her divorce and re-marriage.
Rashida's story is far from unique. Ameena, who had completed college and was working in childcare, was married at 20. She resisted the marriage at first, but eventually, she says, 'I just went along with it because I was sick of it and I thought just get it over and life's a gamble anyway.' Her husband's family refused to let her work; on one occasion, she says, she applied for a job but her in-laws stopped her going for the interview. She was put under enormous pressure to bear children, and was severely castigated for not becoming pregnant immediately after marriage. Eventually, after bearing several children, she managed to escape and got a council house. She has since refused re-marriage, fearing a similar scenario, and has resumed working.
Other women, in less extreme situations, can resist family pressures and expectations without such direct confrontation. Parveen, in her late thirties with one child, says that her mother-in-law 'always hints' that she should have another child; her response was simply not to say anything. Jameela adopted a similar strategy: 'My mother in law would phone every other day asking are you pregnant. I would say "no mother". I didn't tell her that I was not trying for a baby.' Such approaches are easier when those exerting the pressure are geographically distant. A couple of other women said they achieved some degree of control by concealing their contraceptive practices from their husbands.
At the other end of the spectrum were women who apparently had a good deal of control over their reproductive lives. This often involves taking strategic decisions to balance reproductive goals with other demands. One or two interviewees had postponed child-bearing in order to pursue careers or care-free time as a couple. However, more commonly, the decision was to defer other goals until after childbearing. For example, Hamid and his wife Zubaida both had university degrees and promising careers before marriage. Zubaida decided to put her career 'on hold' while they had children early in their marriage. They now have two children, the younger of whom will start school in a year's time, at which point Zubaida will resume her career. Hamid runs his own business and will work from home in order to help out with childcare.
Similarly, Naseem, (see above), had taken A-levels and was working as a bilingual assistant when she married at the age of 21. She wanted children and so decided against using contraception until her family was complete. She gave up work when she became pregnant with her first child: A key point is that these, and other, young women are engaging with new educational and work opportunities while openly rejecting what they see as constraints associated with 'modern' child-bearing ideals. Such women are actively creating new ways of negotiating and reconciling different sets of aspirations and expectations. This is reflected in the aspirations of younger women who have not yet begun child-bearing. Salma, the UK-born student encountered earlier, for example, intends to complete her education before marriage, but wants to be married by her early 20s. She wants her parents to be actively involved choosing a husband and, like many other young women we interviewed, does not see an arranged marriage as incompatible with romance (see Shaw and Charsley, 2006 
Temporalities in reproductive lives
One strikingly common feature of women's reproductive stories was an increasing sense of agency and control over time. For many women, early marriage entails fulfilling pre-scripted child-bearing obligations and expectations. Indeed, to have specific reproductive plans early in married life was widely considered improper, indicative of excessive worldliness and lack of innocence (cf. Mumtaz and Salway, 2007; In each of these cases, women gained an unexpected degree of control over their reproductive lives because of chance events which conspired to delay marriage. Ameena's experience of economic independence eventually enabled her to escape from a marriage in which she had very little control. By contrast, Parveen's unexpected career development led to her taking control of reproductive decisions early in married life.
Discussion
Demographic analyses indicate that, although fertility has fallen across all ethnic groups in the UK, fertility rates of British Pakistanis remain significantly above the national average, with relatively little postponement of child-bearing compared with other groups. This is perhaps puzzling, given the recent expansion in educational and work opportunities. Most explanations for this focus on 'cultural constraints' (pressures from extended families, culturally-engendered son preferences and religious beliefs), alongside continued socio-economic marginalisation. However, our work suggests a rather different and much more complex story, and draws attention to some important elements missing from previous analyses.
We have shown that an intricate interplay of relationships between individuals, couples and wider families is key in shaping reproductive desires, obligations and practices. In contrast to much received wisdom, the continued impetus for high and early fertility among British Pakistanis comes, not just from a sense of familial obligation or pressure, but very often from young women and men themselves. While 21 it is true that some women's childbearing is heavily circumscribed by their families, other women make active and strategic choices to begin childbearing early and then pursue other interests (education, employment, leisure) later in life.
This is not to deny the importance of wider families; indeed, we argue that extended families continue play a key role in reproductive decisions. However, rather than necessarily being a coercive force, we highlight the role of emotions attached to family relationships in shaping young British Pakistanis' reproductive choices. In particular, interviewees' desires to provide both brothers and sisters for their offspring were usually rooted in deep attachments that they felt with their own siblings. And, to some extent, this extended beyond the nuclear family, since, in accordance with the traditional Punjabi kinship system, nieces and nephews were often equated with sons and daughters, and many people made no clear distinction between siblings and cousins.
What we are seeing, perhaps, is the emergence of a new kind of family aesthetics in this population, involving a delicate balance between extended and nuclear family ideals. Many of our interviewees pointed to a contrast between the values of the older generation, who saw children's value as primarily instrumental, in terms of continuing lineages and providing marriage partners, and their own relationships with their children, in which individual emotional attachments were foregrounded. Thus, younger interviewees spoke of wanting to 'enjoy' their children and ensure they 'develop well', and wanted to provide their children with siblings of both sexes within the nuclear (rather than extended)
family. Several younger interviewees also emphasised the importance of their relationship as a couple, and of wanting to 'spend quality time together' before starting a family, in self-conscious contrast to the 'older generation'.
However, this focus on the couple and nuclear family must be understood within an accepted, and futures. Thus, several young women who were about to marry or begin child-bearing expected and wanted to have children early, but saw and planned futures which involved pursuing other goals beyond the domestic realm.
The temporal nature of Pakistani women's reproductive agency also has important implications for how we understand the relationships between education, employment and child-bearing. Our analysis suggests that more educated/professional women are more likely to be 'demographic pioneers', postponing (slightly) marriage and childbearing compared with their less-educated peers. According to standard demographic theory, this is explained by some combination of the increased opportunity costs of early child-bearing for more highly educated women plus increased empowerment and control over reproductive decisions. For some young women we interviewed, particularly unmarried college students, this appeared to be the case: they were choosing (and negotiating) to delay marriage in order to complete their studies. However, for many others, the direction of causality was the reverse: unanticipated delays in marriages opened up unexpected opportunities for study and engagement in the labour market; opportunities which in some cases had profound implications for their ability to exert control over their subsequent reproductive lives.
Conclusion
The nature of our study, based on a small group of interviewees in one area of Northeast England, means we cannot draw general conclusions about the demography of British Pakistanis more widely.
However, the intensive and detailed nature of our qualitative material leads us to challenge some of the received wisdom about the reasons for sustained high and early fertility among this population. We argue that the emergent 'inter-discipline' of anthropological demography offers potentially important insights into population processes that neither discipline can do alone.
In this case, we have shown that the sustained high and early fertility of British Pakistanis does not necessarily indicate a passive acceptance of 'cultural norms' or a reluctance to engage with new educational and employment opportunities. For some young women at least, early and high fertility represents a deliberate and strategic choice to have several children while young, which is not incompatible with pursuing other goals beyond the domestic realm, either concurrently or later in life.
However, this sense of agency or control must be understood within a complex set of relationships between individuals, couples and wider families, which entail obligations, expectations and strong emotional bonds.
We do not mean to suggest that, for all British Pakistani women, relatively early and high fertility represents a deliberate and unproblematic choice. Indeed, we have shown that, beneath the demographic uniformity, there is considerable variation in terms of processes and meanings. Some women we interviewed faced intolerable pressures, sometimes accompanied by appalling psychological and physical violence, to conform to the reproductive expectations of others. Some of these women eventually managed to escape their situations and ultimately gained some degree of control over their lives; others either chose not to, or tried and failed. Moreover, as with other economically disadvantaged groups in the UK, early marriage and child-bearing might in some cases represent, not a positive choice, but rather a response to the lack of other opportunities. In a population which continues to experience not only economic hardship but social exclusion and cultural marginalisation, the lack of alternative possibilities in life might conspire to present early marriage and child-bearing as the only viable option.
However, we do argue that, within these important structural constraints, British Pakistani women are not merely passive acceptors of cultural norms and social expectations. For many, navigating a pathway that makes sense through a complex set of financial, social, cultural and emotional imperatives, constraints and desires is not easy. But almost all the women (and men) we interviewed were trying to do this in one way or another. We should, therefore, not ignore or downplay the structural factors which constrain the choices of young British Pakistanis, but neither should we assume that continued high and early fertility indicates passivity and a lack of engagement with new opportunities.
More broadly, we have shown that socio-economic change does not necessarily have uniform (or indeed predictable) impacts on demographic behaviour, since socio-economic change is always culturally mediated. As new educational or career opportunities arise, young women and men reconfigure the various aspects of their identity, adopting new ways to be British, Pakistani, Muslim, mother, daughter, sister, graduate, professional, etc. This reconfiguration in turn shapes the way in which people engage (or fail to engage) with emerging opportunities and the tensions that these are liable to create. Indeed, it is within these tensions and the new family aesthetics that they bring that demographic change is embedded. Rather than seeing 'socioeconomic change' and 'culture' as separate variables in the attempt to understand demographic change (an endeavour which has led to increasingly sterile debates about the relative importance of each), it is time for demographers to engage with the dynamic and dialectical relationship between the two in shaping reproductive aspirations, desires and practices in the twenty-first century. 
